Excerpts from the Supreme
Court decision in:
Stump v. Sparkman
[98SCt1099, 435US349, 55LEd2d331]
Decided March 28, 1978.
Linda Sparkman's mother filed a petition in affidavit form in an Indiana
Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction, for authority to have Linda
(LS), a "somewhat retarded" 15-year-old, sterilized. The petition
further stated that Linda had been associating with "older youth or young
men" and had stayed out overnight with them on several occasions. As a
result of this behavior and Linda's mental capabilities, the petition stated
that it would be in the daughter's best interest if she underwent a tubal ligation
in order "to prevent unfortunate circumstances . . . ."
Judge Stump approved the petition the same day in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing and without
notice to LS or appointment of a guardian ad litem . The operation was performed
shortly thereafter; LS was told that she was to have her appendix removed.
About two years later she was married, and her inability to become pregnant led
her to discover that she had been sterilized. LS filed suit in Federal District
Court against her mother, the mother's attorney, the Circuit Judge, various
doctors, and the hospital, seeking damages for the alleged violation of her
constitutional rights. The District Court held that the constitutional claims
required a showing of state action and that the only state action alleged was
Stump's approval of the petition, therefore no federal action would lie against
any of the defendants because the Judge, the only state agent, was absolutely
immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the "crucial issue" was whether the Judge
acted within his jurisdiction, that he had not, that accordingly he was not
immune from damages liability. Further he had forfeited his immunity
"because of his failure to comply with elementary principles of procedural
due process." Judge Stump appealed
Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The governing principle of law is well established and is not questioned by
the parties. As early as 1872, the Court recognized that it was "a general
principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be
free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself."
***
The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the necessary inquiry in
determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit is whether at the
time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter
before him. Because "some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions
which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his
jurisdiction . . . ," Bradley, supra ,
at 352, the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where
the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was
in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when
he has acted in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." * * * As an
Indiana Circuit Court Judge, Judge Stump had "original exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity whatsoever . .
. ," jurisdiction over the settlement of estates and over
guardianships, appellate jurisdiction as conferred by law, and jurisdiction
over "all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive
jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court, board or
officer." This is indeed a broad jurisdictional grant....
[T]here was no Indiana statute and no case law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit
court, a court of general jurisdiction, from considering a petition of the type
presented to Judge Stump. The statutory authority for the sterilization of
institutionalized persons in the custody of the State does not warrant the
inference that a court of general jurisdiction has no power to act on a
petition for sterilization of a minor in the custody of her parents,
particularly where the parents have authority under the Indiana statutes to
"consent to and contract for medical or hospital care or treatment of [the
minor] including surgery." Ind.Code.
* * * Perhaps realizing the broad scope of Judge Stump's jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals stated that, even if the action taken by him was not
foreclosed under the Indiana statutory scheme, it would still be "an
illegitimate exercise of his common law power because of his failure to comply
with elementary principles of procedural due process." 552 F.2d, at 176.
This misconceives the doctrine of judicial immunity. A judge is absolutely
immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority
is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors. The Court made this
point clear in Bradley , 13 Wall., at 357, where it stated:
"[T]his erroneous manner in which [the court's] jurisdiction was
exercised, however it may have affected the validity of the act, did not make
the act any less a judicial act; ...
* * *
The respondents argue that even if Judge Stump had jurisdiction to consider the
petition presented to him by Mrs. McFarlin, he is still not entitled to
judicial immunity because his approval of the petition did not constitute a
"judicial" act. It is only for acts performed in his
"judicial" capacity that a judge is absolutely immune, they say. We
do not disagree with this statement of the law, but we cannot characterize the
approval of the petition as a nonjudicial act.
[LS] argues that Judge Stump's approval of the petition was not a judicial act
because the petition was not given a docket number, was not placed on file with
the clerk's office, and was approved in an ex parte proceeding
without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of
a guardian ad litem .
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a
judge is a "judicial" one relate to the nature of the act
itself, i. e. , whether it is
a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i. e. , whether they
dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Here, both factors indicate that
Judge Stump's approval of the sterilization petition was a judicial act. State
judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are called upon in their
official capacity to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, as
for example, a petition to settle a minor's claim. Furthermore, as even
respondents have admitted, at the time he approved the petition presented to
him by Mrs. McFarlin, Judge Stump was "acting as a county circuit court
judge." We may infer from the record that it was only because Judge Stump
served in that position that Mrs. McFarlin, on the advice of counsel, submitted
the petition to him for his approval. Because Judge Stump performed the type of
act normally performed only by judges and because he did so in his capacity as
a Circuit Court Judge, we find no merit to respondents' argument that the
informality with which he proceeded rendered his action nonjudicial and
deprived him of his absolute immunity.
* * *
Disagreement with the action taken by the judge... does not justify depriving
that judge of his immunity. Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes
results, the doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the best
interests of "the proper administration of justice . . . [, for it allows]
a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him [to] be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself." Bradley v. Fisher .
Mr. Justice BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr.
Justice MARSHALL and Mr. Justice POWELL join, dissenting.
* * *
I think that what Judge Stump did ... was beyond the pale of anything that
could sensibly be called a judicial act.
The Court finds two reasons for holding that Judge Stump's approval of the
sterilization petition was a judicial act. First, the Court says, it was
"a function normally performed by a judge." Second, the Court says,
the act was performed in Judge Stump's "judicial capacity." With all
respect, I think that the first of these grounds is factually untrue and that
the second is legally unsound.
When the Court says that what Judge Stump did was an act "normally
performed by a judge," it is not clear to me whether the Court means that
a judge "normally" is asked to approve a mother's decision to have
her child given surgical treatment generally, or that a judge
"normally" is asked to approve a mother's wish to have her daughter
sterilized. But whichever way the Court's statement is to be taken, it is
factually inaccurate. In Indiana, as elsewhere in our country, a parent is
authorized to arrange for and consent to medical and surgical treatment of his
minor child. Ind.Code. And when a parent decides to
call a physician to care for his sick child or arranges to have a surgeon
remove his child's tonsils, he does not, "normally" or otherwise,
need to seek the approval of a judge. On the other hand, Indiana did in 1971
have statutory procedures for the sterilization of certain people who
were institutionalized. But these statutes provided foradministrative proceedings before a
board established by the superintendent of each public hospital. Only if after
notice and an evidentiary hearing, an order of sterilization was entered in
these proceedings could there be review in a circuit court. See Ind.Code...
In sum, what Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was in no way an act
"normally performed by a judge." Indeed, there is no reason to
believe that such an act has ever been performed by any other
Indiana judge, either before or since.
* * *
It can safely be assumed that the Court is correct in concluding that Mrs.
McFarlin came to Judge Stump with her petition because he was a County Circuit
Court Judge. But false illusions as to a judge's power can hardly convert a
judge's response to those illusions into a judicial act. In short, a judge's
approval of a mother's petition to lock her daughter in the attic would hardly
be a judicial act simply because the mother had submitted her petition to the
judge in his official capacity.
If, on the other hand, the Court's test depends upon the fact that Judge
Stump said he was acting in his judicial capacity, it is
equally invalid. It is true that Judge Stump affixed his signature to the
approval of the petition as "Judge, DeKalb Circuit Court." But the
conduct of a judge surely does not become a judicial act merely on his own
say-so. A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict indiscriminate
damage whenever he announces that he is acting in his judicial capacity.
* * *
If the standard adopted by the Court is invalid, then what is the proper
measure of a judicial act? Contrary to implications in the Court's opinion, my
conclusion that what Judge Stump did was not a judicial act is not based upon
the fact that he acted with informality, or that he may not have been "in
his judge's robes," or "in the courtroom itself." ... And I do
not reach this conclusion simply "because the petition was not given a
docket number, was not placed on file with the clerk's office, and was approved
in an ex parte proceeding without
notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a
guardian ad litem. " ....
It seems to me, rather that the concept of what is a judicial act must take its
content from a consideration of the factors that support immunity from
liability for the performance of such an act. Those factors were accurately
summarized by the Court in Pierson v. Ray,
"[I]t 'is . . . for
the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at
liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences'. . . . It is a judge's duty to decide
all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including
controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His
errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or
corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled
and fearless decisionmaking but to
intimidation."
Not one of the considerations thus summarized in the Pierson opinion
was present here. There was no "case," controversial or otherwise.
There were no litigants. There was and could be no appeal. And there was not
even the pretext of principled decision-making. The total absence of any of
these normal attributes of a judicial proceeding convinces me that the conduct
complained of in this case was not a judicial act.